We consider a state holding corporation with t wo p lants that may produce co mplement or substitute goods and that compete with one or two private firms. We find that the government partially privatizes the two plants of the state holding corporation and is indifferent between selling the m partially to a single investor or to different investors. However, in the former case the government retains a greater (lower) stake in the state corporation if goods are substitutes (complements).
INTRODUCTION
One of the issues analyzed by the literature on mixed oligopoly is the decision by governments whether to privatize a single public firm (see, for example, De Fraja and Delbono 1989, 1990; Corneo and Jeanne 1994) . 1 These papers have been extended to consider, among other factors, partial privatization of public firms (Matsumura, 1998; Lin and Matsumura, 2012) , strategic privatization under international trade (Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón 2005a, 2005b) , sequential privatization of public firms (Matsumura and Shimizu 2010) , privatization when the public firm is as efficient as private firms (Bárcena-Ruiz 2012) , and privatization under an interdependence payoff structure (Matsumura and Okamura 2015) .
The papers cited above usually assume that the public firm produces a single good at a single production plant. However, in practice governments own firms that produce various types of goods at various production plants, and they are mainly organized as state holding corporations (see Kumar 1992) . 2 As far as we know, the theoretical literature on mixed oligopoly has hardly analyzed privatization of state holding corporations (henceforth referred to as state corporations). One exception is the paper by Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2016) , who consider a state corporation with two plants that produce differentiated goods. They study whether the government wants to privatize the state corporation, and in that case whether the two plants are sold to different private investors or to a single investor. They assume that if a plant of the state corporation is privatized it is fully sold to private investors. This has happened in many cases of privatization of public firms integrated into state corporations. 3 However, on other occasions state corporations partially privatize their firms. This issue has not been 1. The OECD (2005) points out that in the EU governments are the largest shareholders in many partially privatized firms. State control is also significant in Japan, China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. In many industries in these countries there is interaction between private and public firms, as in the markets for cars, ships, and steel manufactures (see De Fraja, 2009 ). 2. Hold ings comprising do mestic public firms have been set up by European governments such as, for e xa mple, the Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales -SEPI-in Spain (see www.sepi.es), the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale -IRI-in Italy (see Cafferata, 2010) , the Agence des Participations de l'État -APE-in France (www.economie.gouv.fr), and the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Co mmission of the State Council (SASA C) in China (http://www.sasac.gov.cn). 3. Examp les of fu lly privatized Spanish public firms include: the telecommunications firm Telefónica, the shipbuilding firm Iza and the insurance company Musini (see www.sepi.es).
studied by the relevant literature, so in order to fill this gap this paper analyzes the decision whether to partially privatize state corporations.
Our paper relates to the literature on partial privatization that began with the seminal paper by Matsumura (1998) . He considers a mixed duopoly where a public firm and a private firm compete and finds partial privatization in equilibrium under moderate conditions. This paper has been extended to analyze factors that affect partial privatization of public firms. Among other factors, the literature has considered partially foreign-owned private firms (Han and Ogawa, 2008) , foreign investment in partially privatized firms (Lin and Matsumura, 2012) , cross-ownership of firms (Jain and Pal, 2012; Chai and Karasawa-Ohtashiro, 2015) , trade policies (Chao and Yu, 2006; Long and Stähler, 2009) , product differentiation (Fujiwara, 2007; Lu and Poddar, 2007) , free entry (Matsumura and Kanda, 2005; Wang and Chen, 2010) , endogenous timing of decisions (Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón, 2010), environmental problems (Kato, 2006; Ohori, 2006) , and merger problems (Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón, 2003; Mendez-Naya, 2008 ). However, this literature has not considered partial privatization of state corporations that produce more than one type of goods at more than one production plant.
State corporations are usually multiproduct, multiplant firms that produce different products, which may be substitutes or complements. Therefore, we consider an industry made up by a state corporation and a private sector. The state corporation owns two production plants each of which produces a differentiated good, and these goods may be substitutes or complements. The private sector comprises two private plants that produce differentiated goods. These plants may be owned by different investors (henceforth uniplant firms) or by a single investor (henceforth the multiplant firm). 4 The government may partially privatize the two plants of the state corporation, so it has two options: It may sell a percentage of the ownership of both plants to a single private investor, or it may sell a percentage of the ownership of each plant to a different private investor.
4. Multiproduct firms are o mnipresent in modern economies (Eckel and Neary, 2010) . Literature on this issue has analyzed, for examp le, market structure (Shaked and Sutton, 1990) , product choice and the determinants of product variety (Anderson and De Palma, 2006) , the effect of firm heterogeneity on industry profitability and welfare (Sy meonid is, 2009), international trade and productivity (Bernard et al., 2010) , and environmental policies imp lemented by governments (Bárcena-Ru iz and Garzón, 2014).
We find evidence supporting the idea that the analysis conducted in the paper is The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the privatization of the state corporation assuming uniplant private firms.
Section 4 extends the analysis by considering a multiplant private firm. Section 5 compares the two cases, and Section 6 concludes.
THE MODEL
We consider an economy made up of a public sector and a private sector that produce differentiated goods, denoted by 1 and 2, which may be substitutes or complements.
The public sector comprises a state holding corporation, denoted by firm A, whose objective function is social welfare if it is fully public. It owns two plants producing goods 1 and 2, denoted by 1A and 2A respectively. The private sector may comprise two uniplant private firms or a single multiplant firm with two plants. We denote the private uniplant firms and the plants of the private multiplant firm which produce good 1 and good 2 by 1B and 2B respectively. The objective function of a uniplant private firm is its own profit and the objective function of the multiplant private firm is the joint profits of its two plants.
On the consumption side, there is a continuum of consumers of the same type. The representative consumer maximizes U(q 1 , q 2 ) -p 1 q 1 -p 2 q 2 , where p i is the price of good i, q i = q iA +q iB is the quantity of good i and, q ik is the output produced by firm or
The function U(q 1 , q 2 ) is assumed to be quadratic, strictly concave and symmetric in q 1 and q 2 :
The inverse demand functions are given by: 
Therefore, the profit function of plant or firm ik is:
The profit of multiplant firm k is the joint profit of the two plants:
The producer surplus is the sum of the profits of firms and is given by PS =
The consumer surplus is given by:
The government aims to maximize the social welfare, i.e. the sum of the producer surplus and the consumer surplus:
To increase social welfare the government can sell off part of the plants of the state corporation to private investors. In this case the government has two options: to sell to a single private investor or to different private investors. The state corporation is then jointly owned by the public and private sectors. We assume that the government owns β percent of the shares and the private investor owns the remaining (1-β) percent, so the partially privatized firm maximizes the weighted average of social welfare and firm profits (see Matsumura, 1998) . Therefore, if the government sells part of the two plants of the state corporation to the same investor it owns the same stake in the two plants and thus the objective function of the firm is given by:
When the government sells part of each plant to a different private investor, the objective function of plant i is given by:
Clearly, if β i =1 plant iA of the state corporation remains public, and if β i =0 plant iA
is fully privatized.
To analyze the government's decision on the optimal degree of partial privatizatio n of the state corporation, we propose a two-stage game. In the first stage the government decides what percentage of the shares in the state corporation it will sell to private investors. In this case, the government has two options: sell off part of both plants to a single private investor, or sell part of each plant to a different investor. In the second stage the firms make production decisions simultaneously. We solve the game by backward induction to obtain a subgame perfect equilibrium. We consider two cases: in the first case private firms are uniplant, and in the second there is a single multiplant private firm.
Henceforth we assume that c=1 to simplify the presentation of results. It can be shown that results are robust to changes in this parameter.
UNIPLANT PRIVATE FIRMS
Denote the case where private firms are uniplant by superscript U. The government may partially privatize the two plants of the state corporation, selling shares in each plant to a different private investor (denoted by the superscript D) or selling shares in the state corporation to a single private investor (denoted by superscript S).
SINGLE PRIVATE INVESTOR
In this case the two plants of the state corporation are sold off in part to a single private investor. In the second stage of the game semipublic firm A chooses the output levels q 1A and q 2A that maximize its objective function, given by expression (4). Private firm iB sets the output level q iB that maximizes its profit, given by expression (1), i =1, 2. Solving these problems, we obtain the following first order conditions:
From (6) we obtain the following output of firms and social welfare as a function of β:
In the first stage of the game the government chooses the optimal value of β that maximizes social welfare, given by expression (7). Solving this problem we obtain the following result.
Lemma 1. Under uniplant private firms, when the government sells part of the state corporation to a single private investor, in equilibrium:
It is easy to see that 0<β SU <1, so the government partially privatizes the state corporation. Consumer surplus decreases while producer surplus increases with the degree of privatization of the state corporation. These two effects balance for a value of β between 0 and 1, β = SU β . We also find that the percentage of shares that remains public increases with b ( β / > 0).
To explain why β SU increases with b two effects must be taken into account. The first is the internalization effect: a multiplant firm internalizes how the output of one of its plants affects that of its other plant. When such a firm produces substitute goods (b>0) it takes on board that its two plants compete with each other, which encourages it to reduce the output of its plants. Thus, with substitute goods multiplant firms produce less than uniplant firms. With complement goods (b<0) the opposite result is obtained since a multiplant firm takes on board that its two plants cooperate, so the output of one plant increases with that of the other plant. Thus, with complement goods multiplant firms produce more than uniplant firms. As the state corporation produces two goods, one in each plant, it internalizes how the output of one of its plants affects that of the other.
The second effect is the objective function effect: the state corporation produces more than private firms since it takes consumer surplus into account. If the state corporation is semipublic, its production decreases with the stake owned by the private sector, 1-β. firm A is semipublic and therefore takes into account the consumer surplus, which increases with the output of the firms. As a result firm A produces more than private firms and obtains greater market share and profits.
DIFFERENT PRIVATE INVESTORS
In the second stage of the game, private firm iB sets the output level q iB that maximizes its profit, given by expression (1), i =1, 2. In this case, part of each plant of the state corporation is sold to a different private investor. Each semipublic firm chooses the output level q iA that maximizes its objective function given by expression (5). Solving these problems, we obtain the following first order conditions:
From (8) , i≠ j; i, j=1, 2, W = (( 
In the first stage of the game the government chooses the optimal value of 1 and 2 that maximizes social welfare, given by expression (9). Solving this problem we obtain the following result.
Lemma 2. Under uniplant private firms, when the government sells part of each plant of the state corporation to a different private investor, in equilibrium:
As in the case of a single investor it is obtained that the government partially privatizes the state corporation: 0< 
COMPARISON OF RESULTS
We first compare the degree of privatization of the two plants of the state corporation when they are sold to a single investor with that which results when they are sold to different investors. From Lemmas 1 and 2 the following is obtained. 
MULTIPLANT PRIVATE FIRMS
Up to now we have considered that the state corporation competes in the product market with uniplant private firms. However, in modern economies multiplant firms are omnipresent and state corporations may compete with multiplant private firms rather than with uniplant private firms. Thus, we now consider that the state corporation 8. This is not possible when the govern ment has to fully privatize the state corporation (as in Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón, 2016), so welfare is not equal in both cases under full privatization.
competes in the product market with a multiplant private firm that owns two plants producing differentiated goods. We denote this case by superscript M.
We now compare the degree of privatization of the two plants of the state corporation when they are sold to a single investor and when they are sold to different investors. From Lemmas A1 and A2 (see Appendix) the following is obtained. The explanation of this result is similar to that given in Proposition 1 so we omit it.
The main difference is that there is one multiplant private firm rather than two uniproduct private firms. Due to the internalization effect, a multiplant private firm produces less (more) with substitute (complement) goods than uniplant private firms.
By comparing the welfare levels shown in Lemmas A1 and A2 the following result is obtained.
Proposition 4.
Under a multiplant private firm, in equilibrium:
The explanation of this result is similar to that given in Proposition 2 so we omit it.
COMPARISON OF RESULTS
By comparing Propositions 1 and 3 the following result is obtained. 9. It can be shown that the main result obtained in this proposition holds that there if it is assumed that there are n uniplant or mu lt iplant private firms competing in the product market. The state corporation is never fu lly privatized even when n is high, and the degree of privatizat ion increases with n. This is a well known result in the relevant literature (see, for examp le, Fujiwara, 2007 ).
This proposition shows that when goods are complements (b<0), the government keeps a larger stake in the state corporation if its plants are sold to different private investors than if they are sold to a single private investor. Moreover, the government retains a larger stake if private firms are multiplant than if they are uniplant. If goods are substitutes (b>0) the contrary result is obtained. Finally, if goods are independent in demand (b=0) the government keeps the same stake in the state corporation in all cases.
From this it can be concluded that the stake that the government retains in the state corporation depends on the type of goods produced by the firms and on whether private firm are uniplant or multiplant.
To explain the result obtained in given by expression (2). Solving these problems, we obtain the following first order conditions:
( , i =1, 2.
In the first stage of the game the government chooses the optimal value of β that maximizes social welfare. Solving this problem we obtain the following result.
Lemma A1. Under multiplant private firms, when the government partially sells the state corporation to a single private investor, in equilibrium: ii) Different private investors. In this case, each plant of the state corporation is sold in part to a different private investor. In the second stage of the game, private firm iB sets the output level q iB that maximizes its profit, given by expression (1), i =1, 2. Each semipublic firm chooses the output level q iA that maximizes its objective function given by expression (5). Solving these problems, we obtain the following first order conditions:
(1 − 3 − − ( + ))(1 − ) + (1 − 2 − − ( − )) =0, 1 − − 3 − � + 2 � = 0, i≠ j; i, j=1, 2.
From the above first order conditions we obtain the following output of the firms and social welfare as a function of 1 and 2 :
= iA q (2+ )(8+ 2 −3 − (7−2 ))
( 1 2 (127 2 − 21 2 2 − 180) − 4(416 − 290 2 + 45 2 2 ) + 1 (1160 − 804 2 + 127 2 2 ))))/ ( 4 + 2 ( 1 ( 11 − 4 2 ) − 11(3 − 2 )) + (8 − 3 1 )(8 − 3 2 )) 2 .
In the first stage of the game the government chooses the optimal value of 1 and 2 that maximizes social welfare. Solving this problem we obtain the following result. , i =1, 2.
